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RESPONSE

THINGS LEFT UNSAID, QUESTIONS NOT ASKED

PETER L. STRAUSS†
In response to Symposium, The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the
Regulatory State, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587 (2016).
INTRODUCTION
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s symposium on executive
discretion is an important undertaking, but it is remarkable for several
silences—for things left unsaid on this important subject—and for questions
not asked. First, although the Constitution’s “Take Care” Clause is
extensively discussed, the one power Article II gives the President over
domestic administration—to require the “Opinion, in writing” of the heads
of the agencies Congress has invested with administrative duties—is not.
Second, the discussion of the President’s undoubted but possibly constrained
authority to remove officials of whose actions he disapproves omits discussion
of the difference between the strictly political discretion enjoyed by some
officers in some functions, and the law-constrained discretion enjoyed by
others. Third, discussion of the executive branch’s clear advantages in dealing
with complex, technological issues of fact, as compared to Congress and the
courts, omits discussion of the possibility that the opaqueness of the
executive’s internal functioning may prevent understanding of the extent to
which electorally driven politics, not technical expertise, controls its actions.
And finally, the empirical exploration of the public’s attitude toward possible
differences between presidential oversight and presidential control frames its
questions in a manner likely to have predetermined its outcome, and in
† Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to the editors of the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review for their diligent work on this Response, which has included the
provision of all the footnote parentheticals.
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considering the impact on public perceptions does not address the possible
impact on administrators’ behavior of their understanding whether the
President’s views have only political or (rather) legal bearing on the issues
statutes say they are to decide. This Response addresses each topic in turn.
I. ARTICLE II’S “TAKE CARE”1 AND
“OPINIONS IN WRITING”2 CLAUSES3
The Take Care Clause figures in several Articles in this symposium.4 All
are remarkable, however, for their inattention to the one clause in the
Constitution affirmatively addressing the President’s power in relation to the
heads of the various executive departments that its drafters understood that
Congress would create, but left entirely to its statutory judgment. Only
Section 2 of Article II defines the President’s affirmative powers. Immediately
after making him, unmistakably, “Commander in Chief ” of the country’s
military5—able, that is, to give legally binding orders, the violation of which
would be punishable by court martial—and before conferring on him the
power to pardon offenses,6 Article II, Section 2 addresses his power in matters
of domestic government; the only thing it says is that he may “require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.”7 In the course of rejecting the Solicitor General’s strong unitary
executive argument that the vesting clause “constitutes a grant [to the
President] of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable,”
Justice Jackson’s justly celebrated concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer understandably characterized this power as “trifling.”8
The clear textual messages are that Congress will be assigning duties to
others who will actually execute the laws and that the President’s relationship
to those persons is one of consultation and not, as with the military,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
More extensive discussion of the analysis in this Section can be found in my earlier
scholarship. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1151 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
4 It is also the subject of United States v. Texas, a case that was pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court when this Response was written and subsequently affirmed by an equally divided Court. 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
5 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 343 U.S. 579, 640-41, 641 n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
1
2
3
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command. From a rule-of-law perspective, these messages suggest an obvious
possible understanding of the Take Care Clause that I did not find addressed
in the Symposium. “[B]e faithfully executed” reinforces the impression the
“Opinion in Writing” Clause conveys: Congress may validly place
responsibility for the exercise of the duties it assigns to the executive branch
in others than the President, and when it does so, the duties it assigns are, as
it explicitly says, “their[s].” The President’s wishes are politically important,
but since he is charged only to see to “faithful” execution, his wishes cannot
determine the legality of actions by members of the executive branch. To say
otherwise would deprive “faithful,” the Clause’s passive voice, and Congress’s
lawful placement of duties elsewhere of meaning. The responsibility for
determining legality belongs first to the persons on whom Congress has
conferred the duties and, second, to the courts.
Thus, in virtually any lawsuit challenging an action by an element of the
executive branch, the issue is the legality of an action by someone other than
the President. In United States v. Texas, the action at issue was taken by Jeh
Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security.9 Secretary Johnson could not
demonstrate that his action was lawful by asserting that he was executing a
presidential command, and the government’s argument of the case made no
such claim. The President’s communicated wishes are persuasive only if he was
seeing to it that Secretary Johnson was “faithfully” executing the law. If he
was—that is, if Secretary Johnson’s acts meet the test of legality—the fact that
the President requested, even demanded, the action adds little, if anything, to the
matter.10 We may expect/applaud/appreciate Secretary Johnson’s political
loyalty, but that does not concern the legality of his behavior, which is a prior
question and one that he is himself responsible for deciding. The analysis by
the Office of Legal Counsel,11 which Professor Bellia addresses at some
length,12 may have helped Secretary Johnson in reaching that assessment.
What one should note, however, is that it was properly addressed to him and

9 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 190 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting).
10 This is not to foreclose the possibility that a court would think the President’s view is entitled

to some weight in its own assessment of legality—reasoning, for example, from any responsibility
the President may have had for the drafting of the legislation, any impetus he may have given to its
initial implementation, and the possibility that his embracive responsibility for law-execution,
provides a basis for understanding the law in question that a court—presented with a particular,
narrow question in a possibly eccentric context—would lack. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).
11 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. (2014),
2014 OLC Lexis 2.
12 Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discrimination, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753,
1765-69 (2016).
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to his authority, not to the President and his. Any legal error would be his,
not the President’s.
That Secretary Johnson has this indefeasible responsibility for legality,
backed up by the courts, could be thought an important source of resistance
to presidential “arrogance,” as Michael Gerhardt persuasively characterizes
our prevailing drift toward one-person government.13 If and to the extent he
understands on whose shoulders the ultimate responsibility for decision sits,
it creates an opportunity for counter-pressure within the executive branch14
and in that way supports the rule-of-law side of administrative action.
II. REMOVAL, MYERS,15 AND THE MEANING OF “DISCRETION”16
Unlike “command,” the President’s power to remove members of the
executive branch from office is readily associated with the President’s care-taking
responsibility. Here, however, the Symposium’s discussions oddly omit a
perspective on the removal cases that, in my judgment, serves to reconcile
Myers with all that has come after on the subject, most recently Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.17
This reconciliation would be effected if we were to understand Myers as
resting fundamentally on the understanding that, since it is the President’s
obligation to “take Care,” Congress cannot require the Senate to agree to
removal. Understanding Myers in this way, however, does not entail barring
Congress from creating conditions that must be satisfied by the President as
a condition of valid removal. We have the civil service, which has included
individuals reaching high up into presidential administrations, at one time
including, for example, the chief of the Forest Service.18 Then there are the
independent regulatory commissioners, the special prosecutors,
administrative law judges (ALJs), and other inferior officers whose executive
branch responsibilities require the possibility of some presidential “Take
Care” oversight, but not necessarily full freedom to remove them from office
without cause. Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Myers baldly asserted an
equivalence between presidential authority over those who of necessity spoke
for him in contexts in which, as Chief Justice Marshall famously remarked,
Michael Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-51 (2016).
See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
15 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
16 The arguments of this Section draw heavily on Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of
Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2255 (2011), and Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note 3, at 614-16.
17 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
18 Roger A. Sedjo, Does the Forest Service Have a Future? A Thought-Provoking View, in A VISION
FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: GOALS FOR ITS NEXT CENTURY 176, 184 (Roger A. Sedjo ed., 2000).
13
14
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they were “the mere organ by whom [his] will is communicated” so that
“nothing can be more perfectly clear that their acts are only politically
examinable,”19 and others exercising a discretion that is tolerable only because
it is constrained by law and subject to judicial control for its legality.20 A
symposium addressed to “executive discretion” might surely have noted that
“discretion” is a slippery concept, calling Chief Justice Taft’s assertion of
equivalence between removing a Secretary of State and removing Portland’s
postmaster into doubt. The only proposition that Myers necessarily decided,
that the Senate could not demand the right of consent to a removal from
executive office, suffices to sustain the opinion.
This perspective makes the holding of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
easy to accept, if not all of its reasoning; Congress had claimed no removal
role.21 It helps understand Bowsher v. Synar, where Congress did claim such a
role,22 and Morrison v. Olson, where, again, the issue was one of limits on
presidential control.23 Free Enterprise Fund is in this respect unique, finding
that making the SEC, rather than the President, responsible for “for cause”
removal offended Article II.24 Again, it seems appropriate to understand the
opinion’s holding in institutional rather than individual terms, despite its
diction. The Court holds that the SEC is a “department” of the executive
branch for purposes of Article II’s Appointments Clause, and reasons further
from constitutional necessity that it must be subject to presidential
oversight.25 But that oversight would be impeded, and Congress would have
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
“There is nothing in the Constitution which permits a distinction between the removal of
the head of a department or a bureau, when he discharges a political duty of the President or
exercises his discretion, and the removal of executive officers engaged in the discharge of their other
normal duties. The imperative reasons requiring an unrestricted power to remove the most
important of his subordinates in their most important duties must, therefore, control the
interpretation of the Constitution as to all appointed by him.” 272 U.S. at 134.
Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit pithily stated the proposition that judicial review is the
required coin of valid delegations of ordinary administrative discretion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA: “Congress
has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—and courts have upheld such delegation—
because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory
limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or
discriminatory.” 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
21 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). The case describes Congress as conditioning the President’s
removal power, not claiming it. Id. It also reasons that the FTC is no part of the executive branch, a
position since properly rejected. See generally Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization, supra note 16.
22 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (striking down a statute on the theory that the Constitution
demands that “Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws”).
23 487 U.S. 654, 692-93 (1988) (concluding that a “good cause” removal provision did not
“interfere impermissibly with [the President’s] constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful
execution of the laws”).
24 561 U.S. 477, 483-84 (2010).
25 Id. at 511. The Court strangely reserves the question whether the SEC is subject to the
“Opinions in Writing” Clause. Id. at 511 n.11. This reservation is intellectually incomprehensible; an
19
20
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discovered a new means for insulating administrators from presidential
oversight, if the President could be denied a direct oversight connection to
this new institution. Since SEC Commissioners are themselves removable
only “for cause,”26 accepting that the SEC, and not the President, was in
charge of the PCAOB members’ tenure would deny that necessary
connection. Here would be more insulation of an administrative agency from
presidential oversight than Congress had ever yet tried. When the protected
tenure of ALJs, Inspectors-General, and other tenure-protected “inferior
officers” comes before the Court, as perhaps it soon will, the Court should
quickly discern that Free Enterprise Fund properly turns on the institutional
characteristics of the PCAOB, and not, as such, on the characteristics of its
individual members.
III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
If the Symposium is properly understood as addressing executive
discretion of the second, law-constrained variety—not Chief Justice
Marshall’s conception of discretion exercised in the absence of law, by “the
mere organ by whom [the President’s] will is communicated”27—then another
surprising omission from it is direct discussion of the law’s constraints on the
operation of politics. Of course, it is possible to deny those constraints, as
Professor Vermeule has seemed to do on occasion,28 and as my colleague

agency can hardly be a “freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or
contained within any other such component,” id. at 511, without being subject to the only positive
presidential power over domestic administration, which Article II creates.
26 This proposition cannot simply be assumed, as the Court appeared to do, id. at 487, despite
Justice Breyer’s persuasive showing that the omission of “for cause” protection from the statute
creating the SEC was almost certainly deliberate—the product of the still unchallenged reasoning
of Myers, id. at 546-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Neither can the proposition be considered a matter
of “convention,” as Professor Vermeule suggests, see Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1949, 1950-52 (2016), since Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion holds that the PCAOB’s
considerable powers are valid. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508 (majority opinion). That holding, in
turn, depends on the constitutional propriety that, his opinion reasons, does exist as to “for cause”
protected SEC commissioners’ oversight of their ordinary subordinates.
27 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
28 See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (arguing that executive power goes largely unchecked
in the modern administrative state); Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015) (reviewing
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) and arguing that
administrative law is, indeed, lawful); Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
673 (2015) (arguing that abuse of government power is something to be optimized rather than
something to be eradicated); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1095 (2009) (arguing there are various areas in the law where the President is given authority
to act without regard for traditional legal constraints).
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Philip Hamburger has emphatically lamented.29 But if, as Judge Leventhal
pithily remarked, ordinary administrative discretion is tolerated only because
it is constrained by law, “because there is court review to assure that the
agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it
fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not
irrational or discriminatory,”30 then one might have thought discussions of
that discretion would address the law versus politics boundary. And there is
very little of that in the Symposium.
One of the more celebrated judicial discussions of the propriety of
political guidance to law-constrained discretion’s exercise comes in the
peroration to Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.31

Notice two things here. First, in Justice Stevens’s formulation, we have the
agency appropriately “rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration’s views of
wise policy to inform its judgments.”32 Second, the opinion is one that explores
in considerable detail the reasonableness of the outcome the agency has
reached—congruent, again, with Judge Leventhal’s pithy explanation33 of the
29 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Philip
Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 205 (2016), http://www.texaslrev.com/
vermeule-unbound-2/ [https://perma.cc/EW36-Q2H3].
30 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
31 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
32 Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
33 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. One finds the same pattern in another case widely
relied upon for its acceptance of presidential interventions in important rulemakings: Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). That court proclaims its indifference to the possibility that
“undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but
different from the outcome that would [otherwise] have [been] obtained,” id. at 408, only after it
dedicated almost a hundred pages of the opinion to an exquisitely detailed review of the agency’s
reasoning and the factual basis for it.
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coin with which this particular form of executive discretion has been
purchased. The assumed legal framework is one in which the agency is
responsible for the factfinding and the reasoning by which the rule’s validity
is judged.
Unanticipated in the 1980s, when these words were written—but the
occasion for considerable commentary today—is the way in which regulatory
impact analysis under Executive Order 12,86634 and Executive Order 13,56335
(hereinafter Executive Orders) has moved Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) rulemaking—statutorily imagined as an agency-internal process—from
the agency to the White House.36 Lobbying happens there, before the ostensible
“public comment period” of the APA, and between the close of the comment
period and publication of a final rule.37 “[T]he incumbent administration[]”
forcefully transmits not only its “views of wise policy”38 but also its views of
the facts, and it acts to secure its assessments of political advantage.39 In
effect, the White House has taken over duties Congress conferred on the
administrators and the procedures it established for their exercise.

34 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994) (requiring significant regulatory actions
to be submitted for review to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)).
35 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) (reaffirming Executive Order No. 12,866
and the process of regulatory review).
36 See generally Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015) (arguing that the rise of “unorthodox lawmaking” and “unorthodox
rulemaking”—through things like omnibus bills, emergency regulations, and presidential
policymaking—shifts power to the White House); Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise:
Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019 (2015) (arguing that
the White House, through OIRA, is undermining expert agencies’ efforts to be more rigorous,
expert, and transparent in their rulemaking).
37 Simon F. Haeder and Susan Webb Yackee analyzed the 1526 “significant” rules OMB
considered at the final rulemaking stage between 2005 and 2011 (spanning the last Bush and first
Obama administrations) finding lobbying in 126 of them; they found that “more interest group
lobbying is associated with more regulatory change” and that “when only industry groups lobby, we
are more likely to see rule change.” Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the
Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 507, 512, 517-18 (2015). The study did not consider lobbying during the initial period of
OIRA review, before a notice of proposed rulemaking is published, but OIRA’s website listing
matters under review invites that practice as well.
38 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
39 Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-714, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES
INCLUDED KEY ELEMENTS OF COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS, BUT EXPLANATIONS OF REGULATIONS’
SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE MORE TRANSPARENT 16 (2014) (finding that OIRA sometimes changed
whether rules were designated as significant—thus triggering additional review under the Executive
Orders—without providing an explanation for the change); Stephanie P. Newbold & David H.
Rosenbloom, Critical Reflections on Hamiltonian Perspectives on Rule-Making and Legislative Proposal Initiatives
by the Chief Executive, 67 PUB. ADMIN. R. 1049, 1052 (2007) (noting that OMB review is a “major
presidential institutional resource for controlling contemporary federal administration”).
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In his contribution to the Symposium, Professor and former OIRA
administrator Cass Sunstein makes an airtight case for the executive as “[t]he
Most Knowledgeable Branch,” in contrast to the courts and to Congress.40
Indeed, who would wish the tolerable level of sulfur dioxide in power plant
emissions to be determined either by a judge (or jury), or by the 535 members
of Congress—even if that institution had not become dysfunctional—rather
than by extended expert inquiry? What Professor Sunstein does not do,
however, is discuss the intrusion of politics into purportedly “knowledgeable”
acts. He discusses OIRA’s fact-gathering as if it were wholly internal to
government, as agencies with varying interests and expertise work to
supplement one another’s knowledge. Outsiders lobby OIRA on important
and contentious rules,41 and while these meetings (or most of them) are
eventually noticed in the public record,42 their content is not. What transpires
in the discussions, “predecisional” in Freedom of Information Act terms,43
remains confidential. Moreover, the Executive Orders’ promises to document
changes resulting from the OIRA process have rarely been kept.44 The
incumbent administration appears to have used the OIRA process to secure
political advantage for itself, and not just in the service of broader knowledge
and wiser analysis.
For example, a 2013 report prepared for the Administrative Conference of
the United States45 found unusual delays in the OIRA review processes
Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608-11 (2016).
See supra note 37.
In at least one case, this appears not to have occurred. In 2013, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) proposed a rule “to require employers to record and report work-related
fatalities, injuries and illnesses.” 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (2013). Not yet adopted, the rule is listed among
the Department of Labor’s fall 2015 rulemaking priorities. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fall 2015 Statement
of Regulatory Priorities, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201510/Statement_1200.html
[https://perma.cc/7LAQ-BRHC]. On December 10, 2015, OIRA officials met with employer-side
insurance representatives, as is clearly shown by documents in the rulemaking docket. Late Comment
and Petition from Halprin, Lawrence P.; Keller and Heckman on Behalf of Strategic Comp/Great American
Insurance Company, REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;
D=OSHA-2013-0023-1836 [https://perma.cc/LYU7-S9H2]. This meeting is missing from OIRA’s logs,
although they do record two later December meetings with labor-side interests. OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EO 12866 Meetings, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eom12866Search
(navigate to December 2015 on the calendar) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
43 Certain internal agency materials are exempt from FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). The
application of this exemption to “predecisional” discussions is explored, inter alia, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) and Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
44 See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1127, 1149 (2010) (“Despite the directives and the executive order disclosure requirements, however,
public information about the content of executive supervision of an agency decision itself, such as through
regulatory review, is surprisingly rare.”); Wagner, supra note 36, at 2050 (describing OIRA review as
“largely nontransparent”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 16.
45 CURTIS W. COPELAND, LENGTH OF RULE REVIEWS BY THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 41 (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
40
41
42

302

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 164: 293

during the run-up to the 2012 elections, when adopting regulations might
have been disadvantageous to President Obama’s reelection campaign,
whatever their objective or informational merits. The mean time OIRA took
to review rulemaking proposals under the Executive Orders rose from 51 days
in the period through 2011
to 79 days, and in the first half of 2013, the average review time was 140 days—
nearly three times the average for the period from 1994 through 2011. (Note: An
increase in average review time for completed reviews in one year may reflect the
closure of lengthy reviews that primarily occurred in previous years.)46

Ignoring the clearly stated time constraints of Executive Order 12,86647 in
the service of presidential ambitions does not seem to reflect either the
superior knowledgeability of the executive branch or “the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy.”48
Strikingly, it seems entirely possible that the working out of the concrete
example Professor Sunstein draws upon to illustrate his analysis was
significantly the product of political, not policy or knowledgeability, judgments.
That example is the development of the 2014 rule implementing the Cameron
Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, which required the
Department of Transportation to develop, almost immediately, a rule
requiring improved rearview technology in cars, that might help avoid the
tragedy of backing over one’s own child.49 The statute was the product of a
legislative process illustrative of Congress’s difficulty in objective cost–benefit
assessment in the face of politically irresistible pro-legislative pressures.50
A proposed rule was published in 2010 after considerable internal
examination, as Professor Sunstein relates.51 He next picks up the story three
years later, in 2013, when Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood wrote
Congress explaining studies his Department had done.52 Professor Sunstein
presents the issues as if virtually everything happened within the Department
of Transportation. Although his introductory discussion properly addresses
Copeland%20Report%20CIRCULATED%20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5UQC-A2EK]. A former staffer at the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional
Research Service, Copeland’s access to government information and objectivity are extraordinary.
46 Id. at 4; see also Jennifer Nou & Edward Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 733, 735-39 (2016) (reporting apparently politically motivated failures to use the Regulatory Agenda
and Regulatory Plan as they were designed, lest congressional critics get an early start on opposition).
47 See Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. § 638, 644, § 6(b)(2) (1994) (setting time limits for
OIRA review of up to ninety days with a thirty day extension).
48 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
49 Pub. L. No. 110-189, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 639, 639-42 (2008).
50 Jerry Louis Mashaw & David Harfst, The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation:
Bureaucratic Adaptation to Legal Culture, 34 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2017).
51 Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1640 n.107.
52 Id. at 1642.
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the need to avoid tunnel vision, the virtues of interdepartmental consultation,
and Executive Order 12,866,53 he says little concretely about these in his
discussion of the rearview camera issue; and explains delay just on the basis
that OIRA had a lot of work to do.
Curtis Copeland’s findings,54 suggesting the influence of presidential
election concerns, are strongly reflected in intervening events Professor
Sunstein omits to mention. On February 27, 2012, the front page of the New
York Times reported:
Federal regulators plan to announce this week that automakers will be
required to put rearview cameras in all passenger vehicles by 2014 to help
drivers see what is behind them. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, which proposed the mandate in late 2010, is expected to send
a final version of the rule to Congress on Wednesday.55

On the very next day, a story hidden in the Business Section reported:
In January, [Secretary LaHood had] told Congress that he expected the
department to issue the requirement by Feb. 29. “Further study and data
analysis—including of a wider range of vehicles and drivers—is important to
ensure the most protective and efficient rule possible,” Mr. LaHood said in a
statement issued late Tuesday. “The department remains committed to
improving rearview visibility for the nation’s fleet and we expect to complete
our work and issue a final rule by Dec. 31, 2012.”56

One may fairly doubt that in the space of 24 hours the Secretary came to the
realization that the ready-for-release rule he had announced, already the
product of so much internal discussion and processing, should be postponed
to permit additional fact-gathering. Rather, it should be apparent that the
occasion for postponement until after the pending presidential election was
not departmental factfinding, as Professor Sunstein’s account implicitly
claims,57 but a desire to avoid controversial rulemaking in an election year.
The rulemaking process imagined in the APA is a public process located in
the agency to which Congress has assigned responsibility for issuing
regulations, and for explaining its judgment in relation to the public comments

Id. at 1621 & n.32.
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
Nick Bunkley, U.S. Rule Set for Cameras at Cars’ Rear, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/business/us-rule-set-for-cameras-at-cars-rear.html [https://
perma.cc/F3AT-3736].
56 Nick Bunkley, U.S. Delays Rule on Rearview Car Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/business/rule-on-rearview-cameras-for-cars-is-delayed-forreview.html [https://perma.cc/ZH2D-PPN6].
57 Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1636-45.
53
54
55
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it has received. The Executive Orders not only have created a centralized
mechanism for coordination within government, but also have moved the
“public” process outside the agency. Lobbying of OIRA occurs,58 both before
proposals are published and, before final action is taken. And this is not a
“public” process in the APA’s term, with an assured public record of
interventions. It is evident that OIRA’s interventions are not simply those of a
superior factfinder, but are highly political and opaque. Professor Sunstein’s
account is, consequently, just as opaque as the realities he ostensibly describes.
One might ask: so what? Isn’t the President politically responsible for
these outcomes, and won’t stressing the responsibility of those Congress has
entrusted with decision simply confuse the public, as it appears Professor
Coglianese’s study59 suggests? Do we really need to be concerned that
newspapers and the public misunderstand United States v. Texas (the
immigration case left undecided by an equally divided Supreme Court)60 as
a challenge to President Obama’s authority, rather than a challenge to the
authority and actions of Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security,61
as the Office of Legal Counsel well understood?62 After all, the President
publicly trumpeted this action, as he has others.
If presidential constitutional arrogance continuously threatens a
movement to a “supreme authority” state, one counterforce can come from
those to whom the President issues directives or commands about how they
should execute the laws.63 But that opposing force is likely to be present only
if Jeh Johnson and his confreres clearly understand that what they are being
asked to do is to exercise their own authority, for which they can be held
responsible by Congress, in the courts, and in the public’s opinion of their

58 See Haeder & Yackee, supra note 37, at 512 (noting that lobbying occurred during about 8.3%
of OMB reviews).
59 Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Power Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry of
Norms on Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1900-03 (2016).
60 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court vs. the President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/opinion/the-supreme-court-vs-the-president.html
[https://perma.cc/2G29-QSGG] (describing United States v. Texas as “an appeal from a ruling that
the president lacked authority under the immigration laws to defer deporting undocumented
immigrants whose children are American citizens or lawful permanent residents”). The press has
similarly misunderstood a recent challenge to an EPA climate change regulation. See Coral
Davenport, Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climateaccord.html [https://perma.cc/DY7J-TRD9] (“The Supreme Court’s surprise decision Tuesday to
halt the carrying out of President Obama’s climate change regulation could weaken or even imperil
the international global warming accord . . . .”).
62 Bellia, supra note 12, at 1755.
63 See generally Katyal, supra note 14.
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service.64 And that is what the Constitution imagines when it refers to their
duties, when it describes their obligation to provide the President with written
opinions of how they will exercise those duties of theirs,65 and when it tells the
President to assure faithful execution by others (“be faithfully executed”).66
This outcome is only possible if Presidents respect the laws that place those
duties in individuals other than themselves.
Among the Nixon tapes are two conversations from 1971: one between
President Nixon, Henry Ford, Lido “Lee” Iacocca, and John Ehrlichman; and
the other between Ehrlichman and John Volpe, then Secretary of
Transportation.67 Ford was concerned that the Department of Transportation
was about to announce a rule requiring air bags in American cars (which GM
knew how to do a lot better than Ford at the time), fearing disaster for the
American automobile industry. Ehrlichman called Volpe to tell him that the
President wanted him to withdraw, or at least delay, the rule’s issuance. Volpe
promised to consult his lawyer, and added that he was “trying to do a job over
here.” The rule did issue, only to be derailed by the Sixth Circuit,68 with the
result that it took twenty more years of needless deaths to make air bags
standard equipment.69
“I’m trying to do a job over here”—losing that understanding, abandoning
the back-pressure that it might produce from within the administration and
consequent constraint on our drift toward a “supreme authority” state, is what
is at stake in the success of presidential arrogance.
IV. THE QUESTION THAT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN ASKED
Professor Coglianese and Kristin Firth properly recognize70 that concern
for the “psychology of office” in persons appointed to office—namely, that Jeh
Johnson understands that he has personal responsibility for the legality and
64 It is this attitude that I intended to invoke in earlier scholarship by calling attention to the impact of
presidential claims of “command” authority on the psychology of office, which in my judgment is an important
guarantor of our rule of law culture. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 985-86.
65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
67 For excerpts of these conversations, see Transcript: Conversation 488-15, National Archives
(Apr. 27, 1971), reprinted in LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 775 (1st
ed. 2010) and Transcript of Public Recording, National Archives (Apr. 30, 1971), reprinted in
BRESSMAN ET AL., supra, at 778.
68 See Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (striking down the standards).
69 See Ronald White, Airbags Have Saved Tens of Thousands of Americans . . . and Industry
Obstruction Cost Three Times as Many, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Aug. 5, 2015)
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/airbags-have-saved-tens-thousands-americans%E2%80%A6-andindustry-obstruction-cost-three-times-many [https://perma.cc/W5N6-7344] (“The auto industry’s
fight against airbags resulted in a staggering loss of life: an estimated 90,000 lives over 20 years.”).
70 Coglianese & Firth, supra note 59, at 1905.
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reasonableness of the actions he takes, and does not regard himself as simply
obliged to do the President’s bidding—is at the heart of my arguments over
the years that the President’s constitutional role is that of an overseer, not a
decider.71 In their empirical study, however, they explore only public
understanding of responsibility, not office-holder understanding. Even those
results, if one looks at the numbers thoughtfully,72 show considerable
understanding that it is indeed the person nominally acting—the Secretary
and not the President—who bears responsibility. My concerns, however, are
with the understanding held by the person in office, and with the corrosive
impact on that understanding of “strong unitary executive” arguments and
newspaper headlines attributing administrators’ actions to presidential
commands obeyed,73 rather than to an independent decision that includes
consideration of “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments.”74 That is a question Professor Coglianese’s and Kristin
Firth’s study never addresses.
Even the questions they did ask, in my judgment, substantially risked
skewing the results toward the conclusions they reached. Consider the
scenario set for all but one of the question series they analyze:
The Federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing (“Bureau”) carries out
the design and printing of U.S. paper currency. The Bureau recently
redesigned the $100 bill to incorporate new security features and these bills
are currently in circulation. The question now is whether to update the
security features in the $50 bill.
Even though it made sense to redesign the $100 bill, there are both pros
and cons to the redesign of the $50 bill. In a meeting at the White House,
Bureau staff members brief the Treasury Secretary and the President of the
United States on the pros and cons. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
President thanks the staff for an informative presentation.
The Bureau is situated within the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Congress has given the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to make all
decisions related to security features on currency. The Bureau will only begin
work on a new design of the $50 bill if it receives proper written
authorization.75

Notice that the middle paragraph assumes that such decisions are made in the
White House as a physical location, with the President and Treasury
Secretary in attendance for a staff briefing, and with the President thanking
71
72
73
74
75

For citations to those articles, see supra note 3.
Coglianese & Firth, supra note 59, at 1888-95.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text for examples.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (emphasis added).
Coglianese & Firth, supra note 59, at 1883-84.
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that staff for their presentation. This framing effectively conveys to the reader
that the decision to be made is presidential. To be sure, the next paragraph
says that the Secretary has statutory authority to make the decision;
nonetheless, the placement of the meeting, the President’s presence, and the
way the meeting concludes all reflect the very point of view the Article
purports to find in survey responses.
Suppose instead that middle paragraph had read:
Even though it made sense to redesign the $100 bill, there are both pros and
cons to the redesign of the $50 bill. At the President’s request, the Secretary
has sent him a memorandum fully explaining how she proposes to act, with a
detailed account of the pros and cons as she and her staff see them. The
President has responded with a request to take a different course, explaining
the considerations animating his request.

This description physically separates President and Secretary, and places the
decision where it legally is (in the Secretary’s hands). Use of it, in my
judgment, would have produced quite different responses. So the framing of
the inquiry likely drove its results.
The second scenario is similarly impacted by framing considerations,
albeit more subtly.
Congress has given the Secretary of Treasury the authority to make all
decisions related to security features on credit cards. That includes the
authority to create and amend credit card security regulations, as well as to
respond to petitions about these regulations, whenever and however the
Secretary decides.
Some years ago, the Treasury Department used the authority Congress
gave the Secretary to create a regulation that required many businesses to
install a new anti-fraud security technology. The regulation allowed
businesses a limited time period within which to come into compliance.
As the regulation’s deadline approached, it became clear that most
businesses would not have completed the required installations in time.
Several business groups jointly filed a petition asking the Treasury Secretary
to amend the regulation to extend the deadline.
The Treasury Secretary wanted to keep the regulation unchanged.
However, hearing the concerns raised by business groups and concluding that
the impending deadline would pose potentially serious economic repercussions,
the President of the United States commanded the Treasury Secretary to grant
the petition and amend the regulation to extend the deadline.
The Treasury Department then used normal procedures to grant the
petition and amend the regulation, issuing a deadline extension.
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The amended regulation was then challenged in a lawsuit in federal court.
The challengers’ lawyers argued that the President illegally pressured the
Treasury Secretary to relax the deadline. They pointed out that Congress had
given regulatory authority to the Treasury Secretary and not to the President.
In response, government lawyers pointed out that a Treasury Secretary is
appointed by the President, who can remove a Secretary from office at any time.
In similar lawsuits in the past involving other government departments,
courts have applied a rule derived from the U.S. Constitution that says
[NORM]. This is the law the judge must apply to the dispute over the
Treasury Department’s deadline extension.76

Respondents saw [NORM] in one of three forms:
(1) Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury
Secretary, as long as departmental regulations (including amendments) are
officially signed and approved by the department head and not the President.
(2) Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury
Secretary, as long as they only do so in “reasonable” ways; or
(3) Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury
Secretary, but not to make decisions for them.77

Here, the problem arises from the bolded sentence in the body of the
hypothetical.
First, this sentence risks amalgamating as a single act, in the reader's
mind, the granting of a petition to engage in rulemaking and the subsequent
activity of proposing and then adopting a rule. Suppose the sentence
following the bolded sentence had instead read:
The Treasury Department then granted the petition and, after conducting a
notice and comment rulemaking, amended the regulation to extend the
deadline, explaining its reasons for doing so.

Now the problem would have been framed as a two-stage event, as in fact
it would have happened, explicitly informing respondents about public
departmental procedures at the second stage that might have influenced the
ultimate outcome.
More important, consider the contrast between “commanded” in the
bolded sentence, and the formulation opening each of the three supplied
norms: “Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the
Treasury Secretary . . . .” Presidents are allowed to influence cabinet officers
and, for that matter, independent regulatory commissioners; that, at least, is

76
77

Id. at 1895-96.
Id. at 1896.
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the necessary implication of the “Opinions in Writing” Clause. As long as
only “influence” is under consideration, none of the three norms is
problematic; the problem comes from the idea of “command”—a power
constitutionally bestowed on the President only in relation to the military,
not domestic government. The contrasting norms do not test the difference
between “influence” and “command.”
Finally, it bears repeating that, in my judgment, the central issue concerns
the psychology of an administrator in her dealings with the President, not the
understanding of the public, and this paper’s analysis simply does not
illuminate that issue. The attitude at risk is Volpe’s “I’m trying to do a job,”
backed by an understanding of where Congress has properly placed the duties
subject to administration, and the ultimate legal and political responsibility
for their exercise. The possibilities of resistance to presidential ukase such an
understanding entails, underscored both by the promises a nominee makes to
the Senate on her confirmation and by the political costs she and the President
understand he would face in sending her home and appointing her
replacement, are important to the Constitution’s provisions for our
governance and, ultimately, to the balance between politics and law in
administration. Political influence is entirely appropriate—but only in the
framework Chevron’s language assumes: “[A]n agency to which Congress has
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy to inform its judgments.”78
CONCLUSION
There is so much of value in this Symposium. One wishes only that its
organizers had flagged the difference between “executive discretion” in the
largest affairs of government and the law-constrained “executive discretion”
that characterizes the administrative state; had put more effort into
considering the ways in which presidential arrogance has transformed the
latter, thereby threatening our rule of law culture; and had framed the
questions asked in ways that put these concerns more squarely in issue.
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